Längst steht fest,
dass es bei dem blutigen Krieg in Syrien keineswegs nur um die Rechte eines
Volkes geht, sich von einem Diktator zu befreien und sein Schicksal selbst zu
bestimmen. Religiöse Konflikte, die
uralte Rivalität zwischen den beiden Hauptströmungen des Islam – Sunniten und
Schiiten – haben dem Krieg eine neue bedrohliche Dimension verliehen., ebenso
auch der uralte Wettstreit globaler und regionaler Mächte um strategische
Interessen. Doch wie in zahlreichen anderen Konflikten der Region hat stehen
auch in diesem Krieg Öl- und Gasinteressen auf dem Spiel. Der Beiruter Ökonom
und Universitätsprofessor Sami Nader setzt sich mit dieser Frage in
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/articles/opinion/2013/10/is-middle-east-oil-a-curse.html
---------------------
Oil: A Blessing or a Curse
Author:
Sami Nader. Posted on: October 8 2013, Translated by: Al-Monitor
Indeed, the
time may well have come to bring this issue into the open and out of the
shadows, where it has been the preserve of specialists. Perhaps once the facts
are exposed, their clash with public opinion will facilitate peaceful
settlements and rational solutions, built upon shared interests and aimed at
halting the killing of innocent civilians. This, in turn, may suppress the wars
now raging and ward off the specter of future wars yet to come. Russia is a
major player in these gas wars. Its tight reins over the Syrian card and
staunch support of the Syrian regime conceal its overriding desire to defend
its strategic interests. Foremost among these interests is the preservation of
its privileged position as Europe's main supplier of natural gas and, conversely,
denying any attempt at establishing alternative pipelines outside Russian
control. For this reason, Moscow has opposed Turkey's growing role in this
respect, particularly following the construction of the pipeline known as
Nabucco.
The Nabucco
pipeline skirts those regions under Russian influence, connecting gas deposits
in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Azerbaijan to the European market. Nabucco
represents the first fruit of the modernized relationship between Ankara and
the Turkic republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkey has
cultivated these ties since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. It also represented one of the principal challenges to
Moscow's influence and role in the post-Cold War era. But Nabucco's success in
providing an additional source of natural gas exports to flood the European
market with a resource it badly needs has not yet been assured. The hope that
it would do so had been — and still remains — the central goal of the cooperation
between Turkey and Qatar. That cooperation, in turn, was embodied in the
project to build an additional network tied to Nabucco and, through it, to the
European market. The pipeline was to begin from Qatar, continue to Turkey and
pass through Saudi Arabia and Syrian territory. The Syrian government rejected
this project in 2009 under the pretext that it would harm the interests of its
Russian partner, with whom it has decadeslong economic ties. No doubt this
refusal provided an additional impetus to Qatar and Turkey for the sake of
moving forward in supporting the Syrian revolutionaries financially and
militarily.
It is true
that a project of this sort worried the Kremlin for two reasons. First, it
threatened to deprive Russia of its role in supplying the demand of the
European market. Second, it threatened to drive down gas prices as a result of
glutting the market with a heightened supply. On the other hand, it remains
true that Syria went back and signed on to a competing pipeline project
connecting Iran and Lebanon and passing through Iraq. The project for the
network in this region originated in the area of South Pars — the same from
where the Turkish-Qatari project originated, consisting largely of a series of
gas wells shared between Iran and Qatar. Nothing could better underscore the
primary embodiment of the "Shiite Crescent," in coordination with
Moscow. This prospective network of gas lines would be independent of Russia's
own network; indeed, it would act as a competitor to that network.
It is worth
noting that this project was not formally announced until 2012 — that is, after
Syria had entered a state of civil war and pro-Iranian forces had embarked on a
full-fledged campaign to support the Syrian regime. Based on this information,
it should no longer come as a surprise that the issue of gas lies at the heart
of the negotiations that took place between Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince
Bandar bin Sultan and the Russian side during the former's most recent trip to
Moscow. According to those portions of the talks that were leaked by the Saudi
side, the most important items included a guarantee that Gulf gas exports would
not be used to threaten Russia's position as Europe's principal supplier.
The issue
of natural gas is not confined to the parties now vying with one another in
Syria. Rather, it also encompasses neighboring states such as Iraq, Israel,
Egypt, Lebanon and Cyprus. And here, too, matters are trending in the direction
of crisis, where religious and ideological slogans trump economic interests.
One can find a perfect expression of this in the tension that came over
Egypt-Israeli ties as a result of the shock waves of the Arab Spring, and the
attacks perpetrated by groups affiliated with political Islam against pipelines
exporting gas from Egypt into Israel. As oil profits increased, the economic
indicators of the relevant — "oil-producing" — states rebounded. But
by the same token, this wealth grew at the same proportion as the dangers
associated with it, so long as the mechanisms for resolving disputes peacefully
and distributing wealth justly remain absent.
No doubt
the discovery of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean basin may yet prove
beneficial to the Lebanese and Israeli economies. But it will also act as a
source of tension that — if matters are not properly handled — might lead to
the outbreak of a new war. This wealth in and of itself has stoked ambitions
and whetted appetites even in relatively peaceful times. How much more
destabilizing will they prove against the backdrop of a conflict such as the
one between Hezbollah and Israel? That conflict has already dragged Lebanon
into war twice in the past decade. The current conflict between the two
countries centering on the demarcation of their maritime borders must find a
diplomatic solution in the corridors of the UN and at US prompting, owing to
the role of mediator that the United States is capable of playing —
particularly with Israel. Just as the UN was charged with drawing up the Blue
Line to demarcate the land border between the two states, it must proactively
demarcate the maritime borders between these states.
Even the
Gaza Strip enjoys a wealth of natural gas in close proximity to its shores that
might contribute to alleviating the burden of deteriorating economic conditions,
on the condition that the drilling and contracting processes be carried out in
a framework of international coordination and cooperation. Turkey has an active
and central role in bringing together this issue with that of Central Asian
natural gas more generally, owing to its geographic position and its role in
transferring gas and linking gas pipelines. To play this pivotal role, however,
it must moderate some of its ideological choices, which have made more than a
few parties uneasy. Instead, it must build upon what was its most distinguished
feature in the past decade, and what raised Turkey to the top tier of Middle
Eastern powers: economic development and partnership.
This
situation calls for pre-emptive diplomacy on the part of international parties
acting to strengthen the foundations of stability and cooperation. It is worth
noting that this sort of mediation requires forethought and magnanimity, and
cannot be reduced to secret, bilateral deals that might benefit some parties at
the expense of others. They also require persistent follow-up. The Iraqi model
— which has yet to pass a law settling the issue of oil wealth distribution, or
even settling the ownership of the disputed oil-producing territories of Mosul
and Kirkuk — is the best evidence that bargains on paper are not enough. On the
contrary, they must have buy-in from the international community. This sort of
buy-in is built upon partnership in the spirit of openness, cooperation and,
sometimes, pressure from the powerful. From warding off the specter of the
threat of chemical weapons, it is possible to move toward bringing closer a
just distribution of wealth that will bring stability to all.
The mix of
religion and oil ignited the Middle East and the world. The events of 9/11 are
the clearest manifestation of this phenomenon. The mix of ideology and natural
gas, on the other hand, might yet ignite the region once again, toppling
international security and stability. The issue of natural gas must therefore
be approached soberly, rationally, transparently and on the basis of common
interests. Such an approach would clarify the points of dispute and seek
solutions in accordance with international law, far removed from the logic of
bilateral deals or bargains combining sectarian or ideological considerations
with economic interests. The horns of the dilemma might serve as the gateway to
the solution, if it is approached in the appropriate way, with the appropriate logic.
After all, did Europe not escape from a situation of war and factionalism to
one of unity and development through an agreement of mutual cooperation whose
first building block was an agreement on coal and steel?
Sami Nader is
an economist, Middle Eastern affairs analyst and communications expert with
extensive expertise in corporate strategy and risk management. He currently
directs the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs, focusing on economics and
geopolitics of the Levant, and is a professor for USJ University in Beirut. On
Twitter: @saminader
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