by Christopher Weikert Douglas
The world has lately been preoccupied with unprecedented public uprisings resulting in regime change in North Africa that may yet extend into the Middle East and Arabian Peninsula. Relatively little attention is being paid to the Southern Sudan - soon to become the Republic of South Sudan, Africa’s first new nation since the post-colonial era - that is peacefully shedding the rule of Khartoum’s Islamist authoritarian rule. Against great odds, the people of Southern Sudan conducted an internationally recognized referendum on its future and won for themselves the right to create a new sovereign state that will be proclaimed on July 9th of this year. Independence through electoral means is no small accomplishment in one of the poorest, least developed, most conflict-disrupted regions in the world.
Citizens of the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan made clear their overwhelming preference for separation from the Republic of Sudan, a fact confirmed by monitoring agencies and the Sudanese government in Khartoum. A peaceful referendum vote was held in January 2011, and the Southern Sudan will officially become the independent Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011.
This ostensibly simple procedure of casting, counting and implementing the result of a ballot – taken for granted throughout most of the Western world – has been made possible only by years of hardship, sacrifice, hope and endurance on the part of the Southern Sudanese. It is the latest chapter in the nascent country’s history of predation, colonization, civil war, and now liberation and peace.
Independence for the South, while momentous and hard won, has so far happened only on maps, in a draft constitution document and in words. The real work of separating the South from the North entails intensely complicated negotiations not just between the respective governments in Juba and Khartoum, but also Washington, Oslo, Rome and London (whose countries were the guarantors of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Sudan’s decades-long civil war) as well as international bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
That there are so many outside actors pushing for the Southern Sudan’s right to self-determination greatly increases chances that outstanding issues such as the final new international border between North and South, ownership of the oil resources, distribution of the national debt, repatriation of each country’s nationals, and the disputed territory of Abyei will be settled without renewed hostilities. Even China, an otherwise vehement critic of separatist movements which has long supported Khartoum with money, military support and political backing in exchange for oil (6% of its total imports come from Sudan), has pushed for allowing the South to separate peacefully.
A return to war is prohibitively expensive, politically and financially. Wary of the active arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court and the uprisings in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Sudan’s President Bashir is unlikely to seek a costly, bloody and unpopular return to war. What’s more, the North has always shown more interest in the South’s resources - particularly its vast oil reserves which sustain the North’s economy and the patronage networks that keep President Bashir and his National Congress Party in power - than in its citizens. Although an independent South would legally own the petroleum after independence, the North will receive a share of revenues for many years: not just as a peace offering, but because the sole export pipeline running up to the Red Sea is owned and operated by Khartoum.
Though cause for humanitarian concern, a renewal of violence in Darfur will not affect the South’s bid for independence. It is true that the Southern People’s Liberation Movement shares the antipathy of Darfuri rebel groups the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA) towards the North, and benefits from Khartoum’s preoccupation with the troubled Western province. However, the Government of Southern Sudan will not risk their survival by antagonizing Khartoum for the sake of Darfur, and has now publicly promised not to support the JEM or let it use the South as a base of operations.
There are several reasons for this. First, Darfur lacks the advantages of ample natural resources as well as geographical, ethnic and religious distance from the central government in Khartoum enjoyed by the South. Second, the North’s interests in Darfur are too great, the rebel movements appear too disorganized and the cause of Darfuri independence lacks enough international support for there to be much hope for a permanent ceasefire and pathway to independence as enjoyed by the South. Third, the Darfuris are not considered “Southern”, and the Southern Sudanese remember that Muslim tribes from Darfur were among those that historically participated in the killing, robbing or enslavement of their people. Although it is an unhappy fact, most Darfuris are by now either dead or living in refugee camps outside their homeland.
All evidence thus seems to indicate that the South will be allowed to become independent. But history shows that a new nation’s greatest challenge is not achieving independence, but surviving and prospering once independent.
The country possesses a number of advantages at its genesis. History aside, the Southern Sudan is a clean, green slate. Its kilometers of forest, jungle, grassland, and waterways have never seen the industrialization or concentrations of wealth which spawn such pollution or corruption as one finds in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo or Kenya. Having never been industrialized, its soil and rivers are clean. Thousands of acres of arable land and plentiful water could provide ample food for itself and its neighbors in a part of the world that is constantly at risk for famine, as they had done before the disruption and death of war. Vast wildernesses hosting surprisingly large populations of animals could become one of the world’s premier ecotourist destinations. Forest, mineral and petroleum resources - properly controlled and regulated as in Botswana – could provide valuable capital for stability and growth. Most importantly the country has a large civilian pool of young citizens, many educated overseas during the war and now returning to their homeland, eager to work and learn new skills, and build a prosperous, free and democratic country.
It isn’t only the Southern Sudanese who look forward to such a future. An economically prosperous South Sudan could be a strong trading partner and a balm for East Africa’s economic woes.
While this innocence and untamed state is the basis of South Sudan’s promise, it is also the source of its greatest threats. The new country is ill prepared for life as a sovereign state bearing sovereign responsibilities in these difficult and dangerous times.
For one, the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) does not have long to learn how to satisfy or manage the expectations of its 8 million constituents. The Southern Sudanese were largely ignored or left to fend for themselves – when not actively victimized – under the foreign rule of Ottoman, then British rule The neglect and exploitation of the South increased in intensity under Khartoum. As a consequence of their history, the South lacks the necessary experience with civil administration, sovereign governance, finance and foreign affairs.
The Southern Sudanese have worked together to win their right to democratic self-determination, but ethnic fault lines are notoriously dangerous in this part of the world. The scarred histories of neighboring Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya warn what may happen when development proceeds too slowly or unequally, and too much wealth and political power is perceived to be in the wrong hands. There are abundant publicized accounts of inter-ethnic fighting between groups such as the Dinka, Murle and Nuer over land and cattle. While yet to reach the same intensity, there is growing criticism and harassment of Ugandans, Kenyans, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Somalis, Indians and Chinese because they are perceived as taking too many of the jobs and natural resources, robbing Southern Sudan of its future.
Then there is the well documented absence of physical and personnel infrastructure. While much of the country’s leadership received university educations in Khartoum, overseas or elsewhere in Africa, most Southern Sudanese are lucky to have more than an elementary education, and almost all vocational schools and the traditional oral transference of skills were crippled by decades of war. Municipal services such as trash collection, sewage, electricity and telecommunication are virtually impossible to find outside of major cities such as Juba or Bor. Most essential materials, such as building supplies and wooden utility poles, are imported at great cost.
Foreign aid, charities, and an inconsistent share of oil revenues from Khartoum have until now been just enough to sustain the Southern Sudanese and their government, keep the unpaved roads minimally traversable, the hospitals and schools nominally functional. Foreign government assistance efforts and others private and religious based groups will not leave immediately after independence Sovereign ownership of the oil resources will bring money to the government, but the global economic crisis has tightened budgets throughout North America and Europe, and constructing a civil society or a prosperous economy requires more than charity and petrodollars.
The Southern Sudanese need partners, not just donors. Invaluable efforts are being made to train the country’s civil servants, police, lawyers and doctors – the administrative lifeblood of a state – but they will need mentorship and guidance beyond any short term or limited seminars and training programs. Businesses in the United States, Canada, Germany, France, the U.K. and elsewhere must help grow the private sector in cities like Juba, Bor and Malakal, and advise a new generation of entrepreneurs. The Southern Sudan’s health and prosperity is imperative to the stability of East Africa.
Money will pour into Southern Sudan, and many journalists are already describing the “boom town” atmosphere of the capitol city Juba. Without the capacity to educate and train its own people, grow its own industries and carefully develop its own business ethics, there is the risk it will drown in the billions of dollars and unscrupulous interests that chase gold, oil and land in Africa and throughout the developing world. Oil wells, strip mines and factories can quickly become fountains of pollution and corruption, civil discontent, poverty and misery.
The Southern Sudanese are well aware of their situation, the price they’ve paid to get this far, and the challenges ahead. But having only begun to manage their own lives after years of oppression and guerilla warfare, there is almost too much to learn in too little time. They have earned more attention and engagement from Europe and America but only time will tell if we have the ability to selectively reward the countries that most deserve our support.
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Christopher Weikert Douglas is a founding partner and director of Kinyeti Development, a private company engaged in the economic development of South Sudan. He has travelled extensively throughout Europe, Southeast Asia, China and the Middle East. He received his B.A. from The University of the South, Sewanee, and M.A. from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce of the University of Kentucky and an M.A. in German also in 2008.”
Freitag, 11. März 2011
SUDAN: The Future Republic of South Sudan
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